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 Race Discrimination or Inequality of Opportunities:  








Following the topics discussed by Campante et al (2004), this paper contributes to the literature of the 
Brazilian racial discrimination by isolating the effect of intergeneration transmission of schooling and 
the school’s quality in the race discrimination effect. Instead of modelling just one mincer-type 
equation like others papers, it was decided to use the Two Stage Least Square Model where the first 
step of modelling control the endogeneity of individual schooling instrumenting it by family 
background and ability tests while attending school. The paper also provide a comparative profile of 
urban racial discrimination in the Northeast and the Southeast recognizing the important differences 
across regions in Brazil both in terms of economic development and racial composition of the 
population. As found by Campante et al (2004), results reveal that part of the component of wage 
differentials ordinarily attributed to labor market discrimination is actually explained by persistent 
educational inequalities between races. However because they didn’t control the potential bias due to 
the endogeneity of some variables, their discrimination effect is 15 to 19 percentage points higher than 
it should be. The mechanism of intergeneration transmission is correlated with financial constraints and 
higher education of parents because blacks have lower elasticities of education with respect to parent’s 
education due to selection and causation. Even controlling the model using instruments, Private sector 
remains as the sector where race discrimination is really an issue. Moreover, the regional profile 
suggests that the labor market is a more important locus of the racial issue in the Southeast than in the 
Northeast, although the significant presence in both regions. However, we are not controlling for 
selection bias and consequently the results must be viewed with caution because it is not sure how 
precise the estimations are. 
 
JEL: J15, J24, J31, J71, J78, I21 
Keywords: Racial discrimination, Intergeneration Mobility, Labour Market, Public Policy, 
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I- Introduction 
The study of racial discrimination in the Brazilian economic literature has been increasing in 
volume since the 90’s. In 2004, Campante, Crespo and Leite revised the estimated model 
from Soares (2000) by including new controls leading to a different profile for the Brazilian 
discrimination. Based on the international literature on the topic
2 they included variables such 
as educational level of parents due to a strong pattern of intergenerational transmission of 
education in the country as previously stressed by Lam (1999). The authors show that adding 
mother's education as an additional explanatory variable turns out the results found in Soares 
(2000) reducing the discrimination component of wage differentials. They also have identified 
and quantified racial discrimination between whites and non-whites in the Brazilian labor 
market using decomposition methods as suggest in Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) that 
allow them to disentangle the part of the difference attributable to discrimination within the 
labor market
3 from what is associated with different individual characteristics and/or 
differences in how the market remunerate individuals with similar characteristics. In this 
sense, some of the race issues being attributed to the labor market are in fact more closely 
associated to other instances, such as educational inequalities and their intergenerational 
transmission. However, parent’s education is not exogenous because individual’s schooling is, 
according the literature of intergenerational transmission, function of parent’s schooling. 
Regressing wages on both individual’s schooling and parent’s schooling without control 
possible endogeneity (correlation) of variables may lead to biased estimates and consequently 
dubious results. 
 
Campante  et al (2004) have also discussed the importance of the Brazilian asymmetries 
between regions to explain the determinants of the wage differential in the labor market. This 
issue was discussed in Cavalieri and Fernandes (1998), where metropolitan areas were 
studied separately and in Soares (2000) where the inclusion of regional dummy variables in 
his model had reduced the estimated discrimination effect. This procedure, however, only 
deals with different intercepts across regions, with no attention paid to the possibility that the 
full set of parameters may vary across regions. Estimating different models for Southeast and 
Northeast, Campante et al. (2004) found that the labor market seems to be a much more 
important locus of the racial issue in the Southeast than in the Northeast, especially when 
mother's education is included in the analysis. They also pinpoint an important role for the 
status of public sector workers in determining the discrimination term. By separately 
analyzing the labor market, they found that black individuals are relatively better off working 
for the public sector when compared to white individuals. 
                                                           
2 In this regard, see Altonji and Black (1999). 
3 In the sense of different payments for individuals with identical productive characteristics, in identical jobs  
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The present paper intends to go further in the some aforementioned directions, focusing in the 
intergenerational transmission of human capital and focusing in the effect of the quality of the 
school on individual’s education. First we will recompute the model used by Campante et al 
(2004) in order to present the magnitude of a possible bias while estimating the model without 
instruments for individual schooling due to its correlation with mother education by using 
Two Stage Least Squares method instead of a Ordinary Least Squares.  Later, we will 
instrument schooling with family background and ability test while attending schools by each 
Brazilian Municipality segmented in public and private schools. The method allows us to 
study in what stand black workers, which are more likely to experience some financial 
constraints affecting their educational choices, can be in a lower position in the labor market 
and consequently reaching lower wages. Pre-market human capital difference determines 
inequality of opportunities in the labor market and consequently explains part of the wage gap 
that is constantly wrongly attributed to racial discrimination. Besides, we intend to compare 
workers with similar characteristics in identical sectors. The analysis will be held only for 
urban areas and also separately for Southeast and Northeast
4 with data collect by the national 
representative household survey of 1996. 
 
In order to present and discuss these results, the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
presents the methodology and the adopted specification, relating them to the existing literature 
on the topic. Section III briefly describes the data while section IV features the obtained 
results. Finally, Section V concludes. 
 
II- Specification and Methodology 
Before specify the model or the methodology, it’s necessary to define what it will be defined 
as Discrimination in the paper.  Reviewing the literature of racial discrimination we found 
that authors usually define labor market (racial or gender) discrimination as a situation in 
which persons with similar characteristics in the same sector/occupation are treated unequally 
due to their observable characteristics.  
 
However, even controlling by many observable characteristics it’s very difficult to measure 
two important unobservable characteristics that could lead to different wages in the labor 
market such as individual’s ability or jobs satisfaction. Some authors, as Clark (2004), take 
individual’s ability or jobs satisfaction as a proxy of utility at work and consequence wages 
                                                           
4 These two regions are the two most heavily populated regions (about 60% of the total of white individuals in 
Brazil, and about 70% of the total of black individuals), which allows for larger sample sizes and hence more 
reliable results, as well as the fact that they represent two extremes in terms of Brazilian economic development.    4
can be determined by theses variables. Clark argues that workers in some jobs can do enjoy 
their jobs making more effort in the jobs being reward with better salaries
5 that can be 
misunderstood as discrimination due to lack of information. However, it’s also possible to 
think that the utility of work is, in fact, a function of earnings because both black and white 
workers in a given sector could have the same preference and taste but been rewarded in a 
different way due to their race.  
 
In absence of such variables as suggested by Clark and assuming that utility is a function of 
earnings, Campante et al (2004) shows that the presence of mother’s education in the model 
reduces the importance of race effect in the wage gap differential. In general what author’s 
identifies as labor market discrimination should be credited to the heritage of educational 
inequality and its racial component by the inclusion of mother's education as an additional 
variable. However, they do not take in account that the unobservable in the earnings equation 
cannot be assumed independent of the effort variables as schooling. Adding mother’s 
education, which has a direct effect either in schooling or in earnings, could bias the 
coefficients of the observable variables. Consequently the use of valid instruments is needed 
to have non-bias estimates of the race discrimination. 
  
In addition to this, any of Brazilian literature papers discuss the effect of the quality of the 
school on the determination of individual’s education. Individual’s wage is normally 
determined by ‘circumstances’ (race, gender) and ‘efforts’ (schooling, migration) they are 
faced with. For example, individuals from poor families are more likely to experience some 
financial constraints affecting their educational choices and consequently, educational choice 
or/and earnings are inherited from their parents. Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menendez (2003) 
had discussed the effect of the demand for schooling (how much parents invest in their 
children) conditionally on their own characteristics finding that the inequality of the observed 
opportunities (inequality of circumstances) accounts for approximately 8-10 percentage points 
of the individual’s earning Gini coefficient. The authors’ deal with the endogeneity of efforts 
and the absence of adequate exogenous instruments to deal with it, by estimating some 
bounds inspired by Manski and Pepper (2000). In this paper, we suggest an average of the 
proficiency test of primary students while attending public or private schools by each 
municipality and also average level of satisfaction with the school by each municipality, as 
well parents level of education, as valid instruments to deal with the endogeneity of efforts. 
The proficiency tests and level of satisfaction are really exogenous
6 while parents’ education 
will be assumed to be exogenous but it’s not necessary a good instrument. Instrumenting 
                                                           
5 It is the idea of tournament models presented in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Lazear (1998). 
6 See Card (2001).  
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individual schooling by family background (parents education), proficiency tests and school 
satisfaction we are able to separate out the impact of the instrument and of the variable it is 
instrumenting for, because family background can be an independent determinant of earnings 
by itself. The instruments allow the estimation of unbiased coefficients for ‘circumstances’ 
that, without instrumentation, can be misunderstood, for example, as discrimination. 
 
The central idea of the paper is to determine how much of the observed wage differentials 
between races are due to labor market discrimination or inequality of opportunities 
(circumstances). The proposed methodology will follow the steps presented in Campante et al 
(2004) and in Bourguignon et al (2003) but controlling possible endogeneity of schooling by 
using instrumental variables estimating a Two Stage Least Square model to deal with the 
potential bias due to the individual’s schooling endogeneity. We are going to bypass the 
discussion of ‘discrimination’ or self-selection bias because we are looking only for workers 
that are already in the labor market without take in account potential workers that could be in 
the market. We understand that it could have mixed concepts, but because we are interested in 
explain the observed wage gap we decide to not correct potential selection bias using 
Heckman methods, paying attention only to the endogeneity of education. 
 
II.a Intergeneration transmission 
In Brazil
7, around 51% of the total population is white
8 but on average, the household per 
capita income of households headed by white is 129% higher than household incomes of 
households headed by blacks. Besides, blacks headed 70% of the poorest households in the 
country. As consequence blacks are more likely to make their educational choices faced to 
limited resources.  
 
Lack of resources is only one possible channel of transmissions of values from parents to 
children. The literature presents the confidence of the parents in the public educational system 
as another, extremely, important issue that could explain part of the intergeneration 
transmission. Important questions raised in the literature can be resume by 3 questions: Are 
the schools prepared to cover all demand from the Brazilian population? How does parent’s 
education affect children’s education? How much parents invest in their children? 
 
According to Black  et al. (2003) some plausible explanations of the intergeneration 
                                                           
7 Estimated from the Brazilian Household Survey of 2003 (PNAD).  
8 The Brazilian literature on the topic usually compares brancos and amarelos (individuals with Asian ascendancy) 
versus pretos, pardos and índios (those who would be called the "native" population, in the US). We exclude 
amarelos and índios, as we believe that these groups, besides being numerically much less than the others, have 
peculiarities in terms of their insertion in the labor market that do not justify their being lumped together with the   6
transmission are: Selection - more educated parents earns higher wages influencing their 
children that will do so as well; or Causation - better educated parents leads their children to 
better education. However, it’s not clear by which mechanism the intergenerational 
correlations are transmitted from parents to childrens. The basic view is the financial 
constraints as main source of transmission. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) suggest parental 
education levels as main channel. However, Chevalier (2004) shows that the effect of the 
potential endogeneity of income and its correlation with education can bias all results from 
the children’s schooling choice.  
 
Despite the consensus of the importance of parent’s education to children’s education, a new 
educational policy is not the fastest way to improve education for future generations. The 
level of education does not change as much as we expect from generation to generation for 
both whites and blacks in Brazil. Velez et al. (2001) confirms the strong demographic inertia 
in Brazil showing that improvements in the school system take long to translate into more 
education for the population as a whole. 
 
In addition to this, another possible channel of transmission is the effort of the individual to 
reach a given level of education. It’s the same idea presented in Clark (2004) where 
individuals that enjoy their school can make more efforts to reach higher levels of education 
and also, individual’s ability can explain why some reach higher level of education than 
others even when they are faced to same financial constraints. We can take individual’s ability 
measured by proficiencies tests of Portuguese and Mathematics of students from primary 
schools (both public and private schools) by municipality, as well the overall level of 
satisfaction with the school as a proxy of utility of schooling that determines the educational 
level reached. 
 
In Brazil, these variables, satisfaction and proficiency, are very important because in the 
beginning of the century, schools were privilege of the aristocrats (whites/riches). Then after 
many law’s changes, blacks (former slaves - poors) gained the right to study in the same 
schools of whites (universal education). However, riches had migrated to private schools. By 
law, there isn’t any racial segmentation in the educational system but in majority non-poors 
are in private schools while poors remained in the public system. Private schools, from 
kindergarten to high school, have always better quality than public schools with rarely 
exceptions like Military Schools. Moreover, undergraduate courses are privilege of a small 
part of population. Public Universities are synonym of quality and good education. However, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
other groups. Blacks represent the subgroup of Blacks and Pardos altogether.  
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only 32% of 1.2 millions of undergraduate students from Public Universities in 2003 were 
blacks and only 2-3% of both whites or blacks students belong to the first quartile of 
household income distribution, i.e, under-graduation is privilege of non-poors.  
 
II.b Is there discrimination between similar workers in the same job? 
Another interest point discussed by Campante et al (2004) is the absence of ‘discrimination’ 
between workers from public sector in Brazil. In other terms, the public sector demand 
workers with pre-determined characteristic of schooling and experience without take race as 
factor of hiring someone. The admission of public sector is based on qualifying examinations 
at national or regional level. In that case, race is not a criterion to determine the salary except 
in case of promotion not based in examinations.  
 
As the public sector careers block wage discrimination, this might point to discrimination at 
work in the private sector. Along with the fact that being regularly inscribed in the social 
security system (com carteira) has a more severe impact on whites as suggested in Campante 
et al. (2004), it may have a mechanism of discrimination at work concerning the insertion of 
individuals into the labor market. Following these steps, we focus our attention in a sub 
sample of workers in the same sector to measure the degree of discrimination in the labour 
market for a given sector. In one hand, we can control any type of noisy or bias coming from 
education inequality or inequality of opportunities because our sample comprises workers 
with similar characteristics. In other hand, we are not able to measure any type of 
discrimination in the access to this job, i.e., we do not take in account any possible 
discrimination during the process of insertion of workers in the labour market.  
 
II.c Methodology 
The literature of the causal effect of family background on the child’s educational attainment 
has relied on different identification strategies as presented by Behrman and  Rosenzweig 
(2002), Sacerdote (2002), Plug (2004) or Black et al (2004). In the proposal model there 
aren’t any interest to find a causality effect of parental education, individual’s ability or 
school satisfaction on child schooling but only to control their effect during the estimation of 
parameters in the wage equation.  
 
The easiest way to deal with the endogeneity of individual’s schooling is by using 
instrumental variables in a Two Stage Least Square model (2SLS). To avoid all types of 
sophisticated notation and asymptotic approximations, we present the simple special case.    8




+ ⋅ + ⋅ =
+ ⋅ + ⋅ =
X Z Ed
X Ed w 1 ln
         ( 1 )    
where w is the wage of the individual, Ed its educational level, Z is a vector that contains 
ParEd - parents education, PT – average of the proficiency test at the municipality level  and 
ST – average satisfaction of students at the municipality level (instruments) and X a control 
vector with other individuals characteristics such as race, age, experience, occupation and 
sector of activities and demographic characteristics as states dummies or regional dummies. ε 
and ν are unobserved error vector.  
 
Assuming that Z is correlated with Ed and not with ν, it is possible to conduct non biased 
inference on β and γ1.  The identifying assumption is that the exogenous variables do not 
appear in the wage equation. The reduced form of the model is written by
9: 
 
V X a Z Y + + ⋅ ⋅ = η π '          ( 2 )  
where Y=[ln w; Ed], Z=[EdPar, PT, ST] V=[ν;ν], a'=[β;1]’ , η=[γ,λ] , ν1=ε+νβ ; γ= γ1+ λβ 
 
Despite the relevance of the 2SLS model of instrumental variables, we decide not only to look 
at the discrimination coefficient that comes out of the previous model by setting a dummy 
variable if white in the model. Following some steps from Bourguignon et al. (2002)
 we are 
going to simulate the potential earnings of blacks under the hypothesis that they are paid as 
whites. With that in mind, our methodology is an adaptation of the Oaxaca-Blinder procedure 
(Oaxaca, 1973 and Blinder, 1973). Subscribing W for whites and B for blacks we will model 
separately whites and blacks in order to estimate “prices” for both population groups and then 
use white’s parameter estimates on black’s characteristics to estimate what would be the wage 
of blacks if they were paid as whites. Mathematically the simulation is defined as: 
 
Model 1  
V X a Z Y B W B B B + + ⋅ ⋅ = η π ˆ ' ˆ ˆ
*        ( 3 )  
where  ] ; [ln
* *
B B B Z w Y = ,  ] ; ; [ B B B B ST PT EdPar Z = ,  ] ; ˆ [ v v V W B B β ε + =  
]' 1 ; ˆ [ ' ˆ W W a β = ,  ] ˆ ; ˆ ˆ ˆ [ ˆ 1 B W B W λ β λ γ η + =  
 
                                                           
9 See Andrews et al. (2004) for further details on the model specification.  
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Model 2  
V X a Z Y B W W B B + + ⋅ ⋅ = η π ˆ ' ˆ ˆ
*        ( 4 )  
where  ] ; [ln
* *
B B B Z w Y = ,  ] ; ; [ B B B B ST PT EdPar Z = ,  ] ; ˆ [ v v V W B B β ε + =  
]' 1 ; ˆ [ ' ˆ W W a β = ,  ] ˆ ; ˆ ˆ ˆ [ ˆ 1 W W W W λ β λ γ η + =  
 
Furthermore, after estimating the counter-factual from equation (3) by changing only the set 




* * ) ( ) ( ∆ + ∆ = − + − = − = ∆ B B B W B W Y Y Y Y Y Y       ( 5 )  
 
The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the part of the differential to be ascribed 
to characteristics, since it presents the comparison between estimated wages of the two groups 
of individuals under the same parameters, which is named as characteristic effect. The second 
term, on the other hand, is about how much the wages of black individuals vary due to these 
parameters. This is dubbed the price effect, which tells us how differently are rewarded the 
characteristics of white individuals, relative to black individuals. In the case of equation 4 the 
decomposition is not so simple because it mix both price and characteristics effect. It will be 
called the overall effect.  
 
In addition to the decomposition, the proposal technique allows us to compute the wage 
density distribution of the counter-factual because it deals not only with the average 
characteristics as Oaxaca-Blinder approach but also with the whole distribution of wages.  
 
III. Data characteristics 
The used data was extracted from the PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílio), 
the main household Brazilian Survey, that is an annual household survey conducted by IBGE 
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) collecting information about 100,000 
households and 300,000 individuals per year. The sample is representative for the whole 
country except rural areas from North Regions that comprises the states of Acre, Amazonas, 
Rondônia, Roraima, Amapá, Pará and Tocantins.  
 
The choice of 1996 is due to the fact that it’s the more recent year in which the survey has 
included a supplement with information of parents’ schooling of the household head and 
spouse that allow us study the intergeneration transmission of schooling from parents to   10
children. The sample will be also limited to household heads, spouses, and their children. 
Others members will be excluded due to unavailability of information regarding their parents. 
We also exclude the domestic workers, self-employed and the employers because our scope is 
naturally limited to those who can be discriminated against by their employers.  
 
The proficiency test and school’s satisfaction data is collect every 2 years by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira - Inep/MEC since 1990. The 
survey is well-known as Sistema Nacional de Avaliação da Educação Básica (Saeb). The 
Saeb collect information about students, teachers and principals from private and public 
school around the country. They evaluate students from primary and secondary schools by 
applying proficiency tests in Portuguese and Mathematic while attending schools. The 2003 
sample collect information of 300,000 students, 17,000 teachers, 6,000 principals in 6,270 
schools from all 27 Brazilian states. The data used in this paper is the average of the 
proficiency test and school satisfaction of 2001 and 2003 (pooled) by each municipality in all 
27 states that are presented in the PNAD sample. The final data set contains only 
municipalities that are considered representative according to the PNAD sample. 
 
The sample will be restricted to individuals that finished their schooling aged 25 to 45 years 
old that have finished their studies. The final restriction regards those individuals living in 
rural areas, which are fully excluded due to unreliability of the income data for these areas, as 
pointed out by Ferreira et al. (2000). 
 
It is also important to stress that upon studying discrimination we decide to keep the IBGE 
definition of race that was tested by many specialist in 1997 and 1998 without finding any 
significant result to change IBGE definition.  
 
 IV. Results 
During the 90’s, we observed an important valorisation of the ‘Black Culture’ that affect the 
distribution of pardos and blacks’ in Brazil. The percentage of pardos decreased for the first 
time since the 40’s. Defining both pardos and blacks as blacks the Brazilian population 
comprises 45% of blacks, 54% of whites and 1% of orientals or indigenous people. Breaking 
down the country by regions, the Northeast and Southeast represent around 70% of the 
population while 69% of the Northeast population is blacks while 34% in the Southeast. 
 
On average, the schooling of workers aged 25 to 45 years old in urban areas measured by 
years of schooling, is 38% higher for whites than blacks, 8.3 and 6 respectively. Whites 
average earnings are almost the double of blacks while the hours worked is quite the same.  
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Center-West has the smaller wage gap in the country while Southeast the higher wage gap. 
The Northeast’s workers have the lowest average earnings in the country for both black and 
whites. Note that whites dominate the labor market in Southeast while blacks in Northeast that 
totally correlated with the race distribution in the population and not only due to 
discrimination.  
# Workers Years of Schooling Earnings Workly hours
Brazil 24,340,567 7.4 597.63 43.41
North 1,215,448 6.8 502.99 44.40
Northeast 4,937,054 6.5 383.38 41.75
Southeast 12,370,650 7.8 692.32 43.69
South 4,087,818 7.6 602.79 43.90
Center-West 1,729,597 7.2 586.23 44.36
% Workers Years of Schooling Earnings Workly hours
Brazil 60.9% 8.3 737.10 43.62
North 31.0% 8.1 679.03 44.36
Northeast 33.3% 7.9 548.73 41.76
Southeast 67.5% 8.6 819.67 43.72
South 87.1% 7.9 641.98 44.07
Center-West 50.8% 8.2 714.95 43.97
% Workers Years of Schooling Earnings Workly hours
Brazil 39.1% 6.0 380.62 43.09
North 69.0% 6.1 424.04 44.42
Northeast 66.7% 5.8 300.72 41.74
Southeast 32.5% 6.2 427.25 43.61
South 12.9% 5.4 338.17 42.72
Center-West 49.2% 6.2 453.23 44.77
Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation






The stylized facts about the labor market presented in table 1 shows that exists a difference 
between blacks and whites’ workers, not importing if we look at the educational levels or 
earnings. However this kind of unidimensional study do not capture all complexity of the 
subject discrimination.  
 
Following the methodology describe in section II, we decided to use a Two Stage Least 
Square Method (2SLS) of estimation. We are not going to test the quality of the used 
instrument as suggested by Andrews  et al (2004) because testing the weakness of the 
instrument is very important when instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable. In our case individuals schooling are highly correlated with parent’s 
education as you can see below in the table 2 (and the distribution of individual’s schooling 
conditional to parent’s schooling in table A in appendix). The overall correlation of schooling 
variables is positive and significant around 0.53. In general correlations range from 0.496 in 










Brazil 0.5301 0.5318 0.5312 0.5394 0.4730 0.4696
North 0.4957 0.5039 0.4734 0.4864 0.4801 0.4827
Northeast 0.5478 0.5526 0.5739 0.5948 0.4984 0.5054
Southeast 0.5317 0.5299 0.532 0.5425 0.4435 0.4400
South 0.5245 0.5183 0.5228 0.5203 0.4123 0.3887
Center-West 0.4971 0.4893 0.4935 0.5008 0.4541 0.4254
Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Note: All correlations and spearman coefficients are significant at 5%. 




IV.1. Results of intergeneration transmission 
Comparing  Campante et al (2004) findings with our proposed method of instrumental 
variables we found that due to the endogeneity of mother’s education (parents) and 
individuals schooling, their estimates are over biased. Firstly, we reproduced their main result 
of 26% of the wage gap determined by prices differences, i.e., the race discrimination effect 
would explain almost 1/4 of the Brazilian wage gap. However, only instrumenting individual 
schooling by mother’s education the racial discrimination effect drop 15 points reaching 11% 
of the wage gap, i.e., the importance of the characteristics turns out to be more important than 
prices. It’s important to remark that family background has also a direct effect on earnings 
and consequently more instruments are needed to really capture the price effect as we are 
going to do later on by adding ability tests. Regionally, instrumental variable methods lead to 
an increase of 19% or 16% in the characteristic effects, respectively to Southeast and 
Northeast. 
Table 3: Comparing race discrimination by different methods - logarithm of hourly wages 
CCL(2004) - OLS  2SLS 
Blacks Whites  ∆  Blacks Whites ∆ 
1.64 2.17  0.53  1.64  2.18  0.54 
Blacks paid as whites:1.78 0.14  Blacks paid as whites:1.70 0.06 
∆2 26%  ∆2 11% 
Southeast 
1.80 2.28  0.48  1.80  2.28  0.48 
Blacks paid as whites:2.00 0.20  Blacks paid as whites:1.91 0.11 
∆2 42%  ∆2 23% 
Northeast 
1.37 1.82  0.45  1.37  1.82  0.45 
Blacks paid as whites:1.45 0.08  Blacks paid as whites: 1.38  0.01 
∆2 18%  ∆2 2% 
Source: PNAD 1996; Author’s Calculation 
 
Restricting the sample to workers not attending school aged 25 to 45 years old, the gap of the 
logarithm of hourly wages between whites and blacks is 0.53. In the Southeast the wage gap is 
closed to the National gap but in the Northeast the gap is smaller, around 0.46.   
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White  YW Black  YB ∆
Brazil 2.54 2.01 0.53
Northeast 2.28 1.82 0.46
Southeast 2.63 2.13 0.50
Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Table 4: Average hourly wage's logarithm by Race - Urban 
workers aged 25 to 45 years of schooling
 
 
Defining 3 groups of characteristics to estimate the regressions we have the following 
structure. The first group, individual characteristics, features those variables (race, education, 
experience - i.e. age minus age of entry into the labor market – experience squared and 
gender) that are directly related to the individual being surveyed. The second group, labor 
market characteristics, comprises variables that are related to the individual’s job
10. The next 
group, regional characteristics, corresponds to controls for metropolitan area, and the region 
in which the individual works: Southeast, South, Center-West, North and Northeast. Finally, a 
set of dummies of parent’s education, average of students’ proficiency test by municipality 
(public and private schools), average of proficiency test of individuals that were studying and 
working at the same time by municipality for both public and private schools, and level of 
satisfaction from both public and private schools at the level of the municipality will be set as 
instrument of individual’s years of schooling. The first three groups of wage equation 
notwithstanding stand for the aspects that are taken into account in Campante et al (2004) and 
in Soares (2000) whereas the instrument variable approach is the new specification from this 
paper following suggestions from Bourguignon et al (2003).  
 
Estimating equation (2) (see table A.1 in Appendix) we estimate a significant elasticity of 
0.124 for race (white’s dummy) on wages suggesting higher wages for whites compared with 
blacks. In addition to this, one more year of schooling would increase the wages by 19%. 
Without using a 2SLS, i.e., running an OLS model (table A2 in Appendix) including all 
instruments directly in the wage regression, the race elasticity is also significant, 0.186, but 
it’s sort out as being more important than schooling, 0.107. Both methods give us significant 
effect of racial discrimination but IV estimate of 0.124 is statistically different of 0.187 (p-
value 0.0023). As we would expect from the international literature (Altonji and Black, 1999, 
p. 3161), the discrimination term is reduced
11 by the addition of a good measure of 
intergeneration transmission/school quality. In other terms, the estimate of 0.124 has the 
following meaning: assuming that everything remain unchanged except the fact that blacks 
will be paid as whites, i.e, their average earnings will increase 0.124 reducing the wage gap of 
0.53 to 0.406 (23.4%). The fact of have higher coefficients of schooling by using instruments 
                                                           
10 Occupational status dummys for informal workers and Sector of activities dummies. 
11 We should always keep in mind that what is being attributed to discrimination actually includes all the aspects 
that were left out of the specification.    14
is remarked by Card (2001), which suggests that marginal returns to education among the 
subgroup of low educated workers is relatively high, reflecting their high marginal costs of 
schooling rather than lower ability that could limit their return to education. 
 
Brazil Coef Std Coef Std
Individual's Schooling 0.107 0.003 0.176 0.006
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.187 0.017 0.124 0.021
Gender -Male 0.308 0.018 0.347 0.020
Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Table 5: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban workers 




Now we can verify how is the profile of discrimination at a regional level. We are going to 
proceed with a similar model from above using 2SLS but analyzing the Southeast and the 
Northeast separately. As stressed before, these are the two most populated regions on Brazil 
illustrating a case in which the majority of the population is white (Southeast) and another one 
in which the majority is black (Northeast) besides the higher level of economic development 
in Southeast. By running equation (2) separately for both regions, we estimate a much lower 
elasticity of race in Northeast - 0.071  - than in Southeast - 0.177
12 - as expected but in the 
Northeast is not significant at 5% level. Observe that in the Southeast even controlling the 
endogeneity of education, race seems to be more important than schooling highlighting the 
discrimination effect (‘circumstances’) in the Southeast. The result presents a quite distinct 
profile for each region: on the one hand, the Southeast features a discrimination term that is 
greater than the national average; the Northeast, in contrast, illustrates a situation in which 
discrimination is much less present. These results confirm previous findings of Campante et 
al (2004) in which race discrimination seems to be more important to explain wage 
differences in Southeast. In this case, the coefficient of race in the Southeast explains 35.4% 
of the wage gap (0.50) against 15.4% in Northeast (see tables 4 and A.3-A.6 in appendix for 
coefficients).  
Coef Std Coef Std
Individual's Schooling 0.191 0.010 0.160 0.009
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.071 0.037 0.177 0.032








Table 6: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban workers 
 
 
One possible explanation to the lower discrimination effect in Northeast could be correlated to 
the higher proportion of blacks in its population. In this interpretation, more blacks workers 
                                                           
12 Runing an OLS model the coefficients are, respectively, 0.154 and 0.200 at Northeast and Southeast.  
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may lead to less discrimination because they have more bargaining power in the labor market. 
To conclude this section, controlling the endogeneity of variables in the model, we show that 
the discrimination effect in the labour market is smaller than previous findings as in 
Campante  et  al (2004). Moreover, the schooling effect is underestimated in presence of 
endogeneity, meaning that the differences in characteristics of workers plays a role more 
important to explain the wage gap between blacks and whites than the race per se. In other 
terms,  blacks are more often in low skill jobs due to their lower level of schooling and 




In order to decompose the wage gap between price and characteristics (‘circumstances’) 
effects, we run the micro-simulation method following Bourguignon et al (2002). As 
described by equation (3), we can simulate what would be the wage of blacks if they had 
similar prices of whites in the wage equation (model 1). Then, a second counterfactual can be 
generated by using equation (4) that first simulate what would be the education of blacks if 
the transmission of schooling from parents to children followed the same mechanism of 
whites (due to the fact that the proficients tests and school’s satisfaction are fixed by 
municipalities) and then, if they have similar prices of whites in the mincer type equation 
(model 2). As described in section II, we must estimate first the set of parameters and 
residual, separately, for both black and whites
13.  
 
Table 7 below presents the results of both micro-simulations. The upper part of the table 
contains the results of the decomposition (price and circumstances) presented in equation (3) 
and (5) while the bottom end the overall decomposition (equation (4)) that combines prices 
and characteristics. In the upper part, the column (e) is the part of the differential ascribed to 
the characteristics, ∆1, while the column (f) is the part ascribed to the prices, ∆2.  The price 
effect (equation 3) explains 18% of the wage gap (column g) confirming that characteristics of 
both  blacks and whites workers is much more important to explain the wage gap than 
discrimination. By estimating the counterfactual by region, we observe that in the Northeast 
the price effect is quite small, only 2%, confirming that the null effect of discrimination per se 
while in the Southeast, where prices explain 27% of the gap, the racial locus in much more 
important than in Northeast. 
 
In addition to this, if the intergeneration transmission of blacks had the same mechanism of 
                                                           
13 Demand coefficients to author if necessary.     16
whites (same coefficients), the remained wage gap falls because we simulate not only the 
effect of prices but also the circumstances by increasing blacks schooling. The combined 
effect (Overall effect) reachs 56% (3 times more than only prices) of the wage gap meaning 
that whites and blacks education is sensible to the mechanism of transmission from parents to 
children. Following the literature, financial constraints and lower parent’s education seems to 
be some edge that is very difficult for blacks to get through. In the Southeast the overall effect 
is again higher than in Northeast meaning that in the Southeast the inequality of opportunities 
(basically education inequality) is one of the determinants of the wage gap that can be 
misunderstood as racial discrimination. 
 
White  YW Black  YB ∆ Y
*
B ∆1 ∆2 Price Effect
(a) (b) (c)=(a)-(b) (d) (e)=(a)-(d) (f)=(d)-(b) (g)=(f)/(c)
Brazil 2.540 2.010 0.53 2.104 0.436 0.094 18%
Northeast 2.285 1.823 0.46 1.830 0.455 0.007 2%
Southeast 2.629 2.129 0.50 2.263 0.366 0.134 27%
White  YW Black  YB ∆ Y
*
B  Overall effect
(a) (b) (c)=(a)-(b) (d) (f)=(e)/(c)
Brazil 2.540 2.010 0.53 2.304 56%
Northeast 2.285 1.823 0.46 2.041 47%
Southeast 2.629 2.129 0.50 2.488 72%
Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Note: ∆1 and ∆2 from equation (5).
Table 7: Average hourly wage's logarithm difference - Urban workers aged 25 to 
45 years of schooling
Observed
Black with White's Prices/Schooling YB - 
Equation (4)
Observed








The same results from above are also presented in the following kernel densities of the wages, 
in which figures 1 contain the upper part of the table and figures 2, the bottom part of the 
table. Note that in all figures, the observed wages of black is shifted left compared with 
whites. Estimating the first counterfactual (equation (3)) the black wage’s curve shift slightly 
right representing the small effect of prices presented in table 7 (figures 1). Then the 
counterfactual generated by equation (4) shifted the curve more intensely to right becoming 
closer to the white’s curve (figures 2). It means that the remained difference not explained by 
our model would be determined basically by the sectoral composition and occupations 
distribution that whites and blacks have in the labor market or other omitted variable. Observe 
that the overall effect makes the counter-factual densities to lay down of whites curves mainly 
in the bottom of the distribution where we find a subgroup of blacks-low educated workers 
that have limited returns to education. While making possible to blacks to reach higher 
education by simulation they can reach higher wages. However, we do not explain the upper 





































































Equation 4 - Brazil 1996


















Equation 4 - Northeast 1996














Equation 4 - Southeast 1996




IV.2. Results of discrimination in similar jobs 
Once we study the effect of the intergeneration transmission on the Brazilian racial wage gap, 
we are going to study the race discrimination by controlling our sample for individuals 
working in the same sector of activities. Our first set of results is built based on Campante et 
al (2004) suggestion that working for the public sector (55.8% of whites) is much more 
valuable for blacks relative to being in the formal sector (54.6% of whites). Observe in table 8 
that the wage gap in the formal sector is higher than the other 2 sectors. Running a similar 
model of the previous section for each sector (public, formal and informal) we estimate non-
significant race coefficient in both public and informal sector (47.6% of whites). The fact that 
race does not determine wage differences in public service it’s explained by the fact that 
public sector careers block wage discrimination due to its admission procedure based on   18
qualifying examinations. Besides, we do not observe significant race discrimination in the 
informal sector that is also a particular case, because ‘circumstances’ and ‘efforts’ (education, 
gender or race) are not determinants to enter in the informal sector. Be part of the informal 
sector is more a consequence of not finding a job in the formal sector, so both whites and 
blacks are in equal position.  
 
As consequence, the private sector sort out as the source of discrimination in Brazil. Being 
regularly inscribed in the social security system (com carteira) has a more severe impact on 
whites than on blacks leading to a mechanism of discrimination at work concerning the 
insertion of black individuals into the labor market
14 that can be also associated to inequalities 
of opportunities as well discrimination. The access to jobs in the formal sector, and also 
earnings, is determined by circumstances as gender and race as well efforts (education) that 
are beyond the control of the individuals.  
Wage Gap
Brazil Coef Std ∆
Individual's Schooling 0.242 0.018
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.049 0.051




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Wage Gap
Brazil Coef Std ∆
Individual's Schooling 0.169 0.007
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.159 0.025




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Wage Gap
Brazil Coef Std ∆
Individual's Schooling 0.143 0.014
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.047 0.053









Table 8c: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban Informal 
workers 25 to 45 years old
IV
0.30
Table 8a: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban Public 




Table 8b: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban Formal 






                                                           
14 Discrimination in the insertion into the labor market is not being explicitly controlled for here, but recent papers 
(e.g. Juhn, 2001) show that when this is done wage differences between races become even greater. See also 
Campante et al. (2004)  
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Going deeper in the formal sector (57% of whites) analysis, we divide workers from this 
sector into 3 subgroups according their levels of schooling (13 or more; 9-12; and 0-8). We 
estimate that 80.2% of workers belonging to the more educated group are whites. The 
percentage of whites in the formal sector is smaller in the second (60%) and in the third 
schooling group (51.5%).  Estimating one model for each one of the educational groups we 
had significant race coefficients in all 3 models but at different levels. In the first (13 or more) 
and second (9-12) subgroups, education is not significant emphasising the role of race 
discrimination in the labor market to explain the wage gap between whites and blacks formal 
workers. The lower number of blacks in the sample can drive the estimated coefficient for the 
more educated workers, however the results founded for the two other groups confirms the 





Brazil Coef Std ∆
Individual's Schooling 0.209 0.314
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.260 0.070




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Wage Gap
Brazil Coef Std ∆
Individual's Schooling 0.145 0.201
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.251 0.039




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Wage Gap
Brazil Coef Std ∆
Individual's Schooling 0.121 0.020
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.165 0.028













Table 9c: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban Formal Workers 
25 to 45 years old with 0 -8 years of Schooling
IV
IV
Table 9a: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban Formal Workers 25 to 
45 years old with 13 or more years of Schooling
IV
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Table 9b: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban Formal Workers 
25 to 45 years old with 9 -12 years of Schooling
 
 
Runing a similar model for low educated formal workers (0 to 8 years of schooling) to 
Northeast and Southeast, we observe that the Southeast region drives the race discrimination 
result at the National Level. The race coefficient in the Northeast is not significant at all and 
educational level or gender explains the observed wage gap but the observed variables don’t   20
have a good prediction power (very low R
2). However in the Southeast, not only the 
prediction power is better but also the race sort out as very important variable to explain the 
wage gap (0.235 of 0.552) that is almost 3 times higher than the schooling coefficients. 
Wage Gap
Brazil Coef Std ∆
Individual's Schooling 0.138 0.027
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.017 0.056




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Wage Gap
Brazil Coef Std ∆
Individual's Schooling 0.081 0.030
Race Discrimination (white's dummy) 0.235 0.038




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Table 10a: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban Formal Low Educated 
Workers in Northeast 25 to 45 years old 
IV
876
Table 10b: Hourly wage's logarithm model - Urban Formal Low 








In sum, the Brazilian wage gap has different determinants according to the studied sample. 
The intergeneration transmission seems to be transmitted from parents to children through the 
income channel related to financial constraints. It’s the importance of selection or causation as 
mechanism of transmission. Combined with some measure of school quality, the 
intergeneration transmission plays an important role for human capital accumulation that can 
be translated in future wages while in the labor market. Using instruments we found that 
marginal returns to education among the subgroup of low educated workers reflects their high 
marginal costs of schooling because the estimated coefficients by 2SLS is always higher than 
by using a OLS. It highlights the importance of the inequality of opportunities that is 
commonly associated to lower levels of education of blacks. The results are in line with the 
evidence form the international literature on the topic of intergeneration transmission. By 
separately analyzing the labor market, it is possible to note that black individuals are 
relatively better off working for the public sector when compared to white individuals. As 
previously mentioned, this shed additional light on the presence of discrimination in the labor 
market in the private sector for formal workers. Wage disparities are better understood by 
looking at inequalities in terms of characteristics (inequality of opportunities) that can be 
wrongly defined as race discrimination in the literature. In the latter, we have a situation in 
which racial discrimination in the labor market is much more important in the Southeast than 
in the Northeast. The national profile is just in between the two extremes, hiding the regional 
diversity of the racial issue in Brazil.  
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V- Concluding remarks 
The first important result from this paper is: without controlling possible bias due to 
endogeneity of schooling, Campante et al. (2004) had estimated higher levels of racial 
discrimination in Brazil than it should be. Removing the bias by instrumental variables, the 
Brazilian racial discrimination drops 15% reaching 11%. Regionally, it drops from 42% to 
23% and 18% to 2% respectively to Southeast and Northeast.  
 
Restricting the sample to workers aged 25 to 45 years old, we estimate whites’ wages 69.9% 
higher than blacks’  wages in 1996. The estimated discrimination component of wage is 
around 13.2% (exponential of the race coefficient 0.124 from table 5) that is far from 
negligible in favor of whites. This rate is close to 12% found to US by Altonji and Black 
(1999) controlling for measures of education and experience using 1996 CPS data. In one 
hand, we found that pre-market human capital difference is basically responsible of the wage 
gap between blacks and whites. This part of the component of wage differentials is ordinarily 
attributed to labor market discrimination but it is actually explained by persistent educational 
inequalities between races. This event in more related to inequality of opportunities than 
racial discrimination in the market. In other hand, even controlling for individuals 
characteristics, the 13.2% wage gap due to racial discrimination could describe a "taste" for 
discrimination among firms or statistical discrimination as suggests Altonji and Black (1999). 
The Brazilian case shows different status of discrimination across regions meaning that the 
market is adaptive to the offer of workers they have. Moreover, the regional profile suggests 
that the racial issue is much more important in the Southeast than in the Northeast.  
 
The use of instruments leads us to higher education coefficient estimates than in an OLS 
regression. Card (2001) explains that the marginal return of education reflects a higher 
marginal cost of schooling between low educated workers rather than lower ability that could 
limit their return to education. This is the case in Brazil where blacks are more often taking 
their decisions face to limited resources and consequently in the end they reach lower levels 
of education. The use of instruments allows us to conduct non-biased inference over the 
estimates of circumstances and efforts.  
 
As Altonji and Black (1999), Junh et al. (1993), our proposal method of analyses break the 
black-white wage gaps down into two components: part that is due to human capital 
differences between groups (such as differences in levels of ability, education, or experience), 
and the remainder—not explained by human capital differences, and therefore thought to be 
due to discrimination – how agent’s are priced. Our decomposition analyses estimate that the 
price effect is around 18% in Brazil, 2% in the Northeast and 27% in the Southeast. By   22
controlling and simulating the same mechanism of human capital accumulation the overall 
simulated effect reachs respectively, 56%, 47% and 72%. The Brazilian education inequality 
is one of determinants of the wage gap and some educational policies must be done to reduce 
this inequality. Policies should be aimed to equalize the gap between private and public 
school around the country, mainly in big cities. The higher effect of both prices and 
characteristic at the Southeast is explained by the fact that the region contains 3 important 
cities to the Brazilian economy: Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte. Consequently, 
not only we observe higher inequality of opportunities but also higher gap between the quality 
of public and private schools and consequently the marginal effect of education reflects the 
high marginal costs of schooling in these regions. 
 
Although discrimination within the labor market is usually the focus of the literature, this 
paper presents evidence according to which there is also a strong component of racial 
inequalities that stems from the process of insertion into the labor market. To illustrate this, 
we consider the case of workers from the public sector where race is not a selection criterion, 
and where wages are not subject to any racial screening. Given that, in comparison to other 
positions, like formal workers, working for the public sector means to the black individual 
that there isn’t any significant racial discrimination. Their wages are only dependent on their 
educational level and position in the job. This fact exemplifies the barrier that is created by 
inequality in the access to education. The insertion of the blacks into the labor market is 
troublesome due to their low skill profile reflecting in their wages at the time they reach a 
formal job.  
 
Our evidence suggests that blacks are in disadvantage in terms of qualification because they 
typically have lower levels of schooling leading them to a lower bottom position in the labor 
market. Then, as a snowball, there is evidence of discrimination in terms of insertion in the 
market because they are less likely to find formal jobs due to their educational levels; and 
finally, race discrimination at the time they got the jobs because they are paid differently, as 
was widely shown in this paper. 
 
Another interest point to remark is the distinct profiles for wage differentials in the two 
analyzed regions (Northeast and Southeast), which is commonly smoothed in the national 
approach to the issue. We have focused the fact that the discrimination term is different, i.e., 
the Southeast estimated coefficient is more than the double of the estimated in the Northeast. 
It seems unlikely that any policy be able to deal with the issue in a consistent manner whether 
ignores these regional differences. Policies should be substantially different in terms of their 




As a general conclusion, it’s quite clear that policies focusing on the issue of educational 
inequalities, with special attention to the intergenerational transmission of these inequalities, 
may help in fighting wage disparities between races in Brazil. Due to financial constraints 
blacks have less access to private schools, which are in general reputed as having better 
quality than the public system. Under this hypothesis, investing in the improvement of the 
quality of public education is warranted, as well as some investment in signaling this 
improved quality to the market because education by itself had a large impact on the access to 
the labor market, and on wages paid in it. In that sense, it’s also necessary to increase the 
confidence of parents to the public education network because schooling is also a result of 
trust in the system. If the system is not attractive, parents may force children stop working to 
help them in the labor market.   24
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IV. Schooling 0.176 0.006 0.000
Race - white 0.124 0.021 0.000
Gender - Male 0.347 0.020 0.000
Experience 0.020 0.005 0.000
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.429
Formal worker - - -
Informal worker -0.115 0.026 0.000
Sector of activity
Industry of transformation - - -
Construction 0.034 0.039 0.382
Others industries 0.208 0.056 0.000
Comerce -0.229 0.031 0.000
Services -0.179 0.031 0.000
Auxiliary services -0.061 0.044 0.168
Transport and Comunication -0.040 0.036 0.263
Social Services -0.181 0.035 0.000
Public Administration -0.057 0.036 0.114
Others 0.125 0.048 0.009
Region dummys
North -0.038 0.026 -1.470
Northeast -0.277 0.021 -13.420
Southeast - - -
South 0.033 0.027 0.218
Center-West 0.039 0.034 0.243
Metropolitan Region 0.075 0.018 0.000




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Table A.1: 2SLS regression - Equation (2) - Urban workers 25-45 years old
0.40
9,140
Depend variable:  Logarithm of hourly wage
 




Gender - Male 0.308 0.018 0.000
Experience 0.025 0.004 0.000
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.113
Formal worker - - -
Informal worker -0.165 0.024 0.000
Sector of activity
Industry of transformation - - -
Construction -0.073 0.035 0.035
Others industries 0.268 0.055 0.000
Comerce -0.189 0.029 0.000
Services -0.201 0.028 0.000
Auxiliary services 0.048 0.040 0.239
Transport and Comunication -0.008 0.032 0.802
Social Services 0.004 0.029 0.876
Public Administration 0.105 0.031 0.001
Others 0.298 0.043 0.000
Region dummys
North 0.025 0.031 0.424
Northeast -0.231 0.027 0.000
Southeast - - -
South 0.060 0.026 0.023
Center-West 0.050 0.033 0.131
Metropolitan Region 0.087 0.017 0.000
High parent's education
0 y.s. -0.456 0.045 0.000
1to3ys -0.459 0.043 0.000
4ys -0.373 0.042 0.000
5to7ys -0.420 0.046 0.000
8ys -0.320 0.049 0.000
9to11ys -0.310 0.087 0.000
12ys and plus -0.213 0.045 0.000
LN Proficiency Test of public school students -8.534 2.519 0.001
LN Proficiency Test of private school students 1.009 0.148 0.000
LN Proficiency Test of public school students with workers status 8.048 2.500 0.001
LN Proficiency Test of private school students with workers status 0.069 0.082 0.401
Ratio of proficiency test of worker and total students from public schools -8.781 2.652 0.001
% of Public schools classified as bad -0.186 0.131 0.157
% of Public schools classified as good -0.026 0.125 0.836
% of Public schools classified as excelent -0.087 0.119 0.464




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
0.47
9,140
Table A.2: OLS regression - Equation (2) -Urban workers 25-45 years old







IV. Schooling 0.191 0.010 0.000
Race - white 0.071 0.037 0.057
Gender - Male 0.398 0.037 0.000
Experience 0.017 0.008 0.044
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.659
Formal worker - - -
Informal worker -0.088 0.046 0.056
Sector of activity
Industry of transformation - - -
Construction 0.224 0.076 0.003
Others industries 0.540 0.098 0.000
Comerce -0.179 0.063 0.005
Services -0.054 0.058 0.360
Auxiliary services -0.010 0.082 0.900
Transport and Comunication 0.045 0.065 0.488
Social Services -0.176 0.070 0.012
Public Administration -0.012 0.071 0.868
Others 0.318 0.107 0.003
Metropolitan Region 0.134 0.030 0.000




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
0.36
2,917
Depend variable:  Logarithm of hourly wage






Gender - Male 0.320 0.031 0.000
Experience 0.014 0.008 0.058
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 0.167
Formal worker - - -
Informal worker -0.090 0.044 0.042
Sector of activity
Industry of transformation - - -
Construction -0.058 0.063 0.358
Others industries -0.037 0.094 0.696
Comerce -0.288 0.048 0.000
Services -0.253 0.047 0.000
Auxiliary services -0.072 0.066 0.272
Transport and Comunication -0.059 0.055 0.283
Social Services -0.177 0.051 0.001
Public Administration -0.194 0.054 0.000
Others 0.055 0.064 0.392
Metropolitan Region 0.052 0.030 0.085




Source: PNAD 1996; Author's Calculation
Race - white
IV. Schooling
Table A.4: 2SLS regression - Equation (2) - Southeast Urban workers 25-45 years old
0.39
3,138
Depend variable:  Logarithm of hourly wage
 